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This paper describes corporate investment
and financing decisions when
managers have inside information about the value ofthe firm's existing invest- ment and growth opportunities, butcannot convey that information to investors.
Capital markets are otherwise perfect andefficient. In these circumstances,
he firm may forego a valuable
investment opportunity rather than issuestock to finance it.Thedecision to issue cannot fullyconvey the managers' special Lnformation. If stock is issued, stock
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Consider afirm thathas assets in place and alsoa valuable real
investment opportunity.However, it has to issue common sharesto raise
part or all of the cash required to
undertake the investment project. If
it does not launch the
project promptly the opportunity willevaporate.
There are no taxes, transaction
costs or other capital market imperfec-
tions.
Finance theory would advise thisfirmtoevaluate this investment
opportunity as if it already had plenty ofcash on hand. In an efficient
capital market, securities canalways be sold at a fair price; thenet
present value of selling securities isalways zero because the cash raised
exactly balances the present value of theliability created. Thus, the
decision rule is: take
every positiveNpV project, regardless of
whether internal or external fundsare used to pay for it.
iThat if the firm's
managers know more about the value of itsassets
and Opportunities than outsideinvestors do? As we willshow, nothing
fundamental is changed so longas managers alwa follow the decision
rule just noted. The sharesinvestors buy will becorrectly priced on
average, although a particular issue will beover or underpriced. The
manager's inside information createsa side bet between old and new
Stockholders but the equilibriumissue price is unaffected.
However, if managers have inside informationthere must be Some
cases in which that information is
so favorable that management, if it
acts In the interest of the old
stockholders, will refuse to Issue shares—2—
even if it means passing up a goodinvestment opportunitY.That is, the
cost of issuing shares at a bargainprice may outweighthe project's NPV.
Thispossibilitymakes the problem jerestiflg:
investors, aware of their
relative ignorance, will, reasonthat a decision not toissue shares
signals "good news." The newsconveyed by an issue isbad or at least
less good. This affects the priceinvestors are willing to payfor the
issue, which in turn,affects the issue_investmentdecision.
The problem is to figure outthe equilibrium share priceconditional
on the issue_investmentdecision, assuming rational investors,
and also a
rational firm which bases the
issue—investment decision on theprice it
faces. This paper addresses
that problan, and solves it underreasonable
simplifying assumptions.
The assumptions are set outand discussed in Section 1.This
section also contains twonumerical examples. A generalformulation
and solution is given in Section3. The last section describesex-
tensions of our model andsummarizes its implications.
We defer the customary
introductory review of the literatureuntil the
end of Section 2, after our
assumptions have been more fullyexplained.
1. ASSUMPTIONS ANDEXAMPLES
We assume the firm (i.e.,its managers) has informationthat investors
do not have, and that both managers
and investors realize this.We take
this information differential
as given——a fact oflife. We side—step the
question of how muchinformation managers should release,except to note
the underlying assumption that
ransmittiflg information is costly.Our problem
disappears if managers cancostlesSly convey their specialinformation to
the market.—3—
Thefirm has one existing asset and
one opportunity requiring
investment i. The investmentcan be financed by issuing stock,drawing
down te firm's cash balanceor selling marketable securities. Thesum
of cash on hand and marketablesecurities will be referred toas financial
slack (S).
Financial slack should also include
"debt capacity," definedas the
amount of default—risk free debt thefirm can issue. (Discussion ofrisky
debt is deferred to Section
3.) However, it's simpler forour purposes
to let the firm use risk—free
borrowing to reduce the required investmentI.
We may thus interpret Ias required equity investment.
The investmentopportunity evaporates if the firm doesnot go
ahead at time t0. If S < I, going aheadrequires a stock issue
of E =I—S.Also, the projectis "all or nothing"——the firmcan't take
partof it.
Weassume capital markets are perfectand efficient with respect to
publiclyavailable information. Thereare no transaction costs in
issuing stock.
We also assume that market valueof the firm's sharesequals their
expected future value conditional
on whatever information the market
has. The future values couldbe discouned for the timevalue of money
without changing anything essential..?]Discounting for risk isunnecessary,
because the onlyuncertainty important in this problemstems from managers'
special informaionInvestors at time t =0do not know whether the firm's
stock price will goup or down when that special information isrevealed
at t =lHowever, this risk is likely to bediversifjable?]
We can now give a detailedstatement of who knows what when.—4—
A Three—Date 1odel
1. There are three dates, t
=1,0 ad+1. At t —1 the
market has the same informationthe manageeflt does. At t0, management
receivesadditional infoatiOn about the;alue of the firm's asset—ifl
place and investment opportunity,and upda:es their valuesaccordingly.
The market does not receive
this informatOfl until t =+1.
2. The value of the asset—in—place —l is A E(); the
distribution of Xrepresentsthe asset's :ossible (updated)values at
t =0.Management's updated estimate at t=0is a. That is, a is
the realization of
3. The net present value (NPV)at t—1 of the investment oppor-
tunity is B =E(B).The distribution ofrepresents the asset's
possible updated NPVs at t=0.Manageme:-'S updated estimate at
o is b, the realization of
4. Negative values for a andb are ruled out. This makes
sense for the asset_in—placebecause of limited liability.It makes
sense for the investmentopportunity because the opportunityis
discarded if it turns out to have anegative NPV at t0. In other
words, the distribution ofis truncated at zero.
5. Management acts in the interestof the "old" shareholders, those
owning shares at t—1. That is, they maximize
=V(a,b,E)
however, the market valueof the old stockholders' shareswill not
generally equal
void. Let P be the marke: value. P reflects the
distribution ofandandalso managem2mt'S decision toissue shares or not.
Let—L —
P'=marketvalue at t=0of old stockholders'
shares if stock is issued.
P =marketvalue at t=0if stock is not issued.
6.Slack, S, is fixed and known by bothmanagers and the market.
The information available tomanagement and the marketissummarized
below:
Date: t—1 t0 t+l
Information
available to:
Disributons Managers of A and ;S a,b;S a,b; remaining S, ifany





The following two examples should give a betterunderstanding of the
problem just posed and the steps required to solve it. In thefirst
example, the firm always issues stock and goes ahead .ithapositive
NPV opportunity. In the second example itmay not.
First example. There are two equally probablestates of
nature. The true state is revealed tomanagement at t=0and to
investors at t=+1.Assetvalues are:
State 1 State 2
Asset—in—place a =150 a=50
InvestmentOpportunity (NPV) b100 b -10—0—
Thefirm has no cash or marketable securities
(S =0).The investment
opportunity requires I =100,so the firm must issuestock to raise E =100if
it goes ahead.
We now examine a trial solution assumingthe firm issues stock
and undertakes the project regardless
of whether the favorable or unfavorable
state occurs. In that case P' =155because A + B =155.
In state 1, the true value of the firm,including 100 raised from
the stock issue, is 350. That is vvold + new =350.The market value
is P' + E (the old shares' market valueis P', the new shares' E). Thus
old PT 155
V =P'+E





v = V' =160
void = . 160=97.25
= . 160=62.75
Note that both old and newshares are correctly priced to investors,
who regard the twostatesas equally probable.
p '= -(2l2.75+ 97.25) =155
E' =-(137.25
+ 62.75) =100—7—
Becausethe firm issuesstock in both states, thedecisionto issue
tells investors nothing about thetrue state.
This trial solution is theequilibrju solution, becauseissuing
stock and going ahead with theproject leaves the old stockholders
better off regardless of thetrue state:
Issue and Do nothing yoff invest (E =100) CE =0)
void in 212.75 150 state 1
void in 97.25 50 state 2
In this example the firm hasno use for financial slack. If ithad, say,
100 in cash (S =100)it would make exactly thesame investment decisions.
The payoffs to oldStockholders, after subtracting theirextra 100 invest-
ment in the firmts cash balance,would be:
Payoff Invest Do nothing
void in 250 150 state 1
old V in 60 50 state 2
The state payoffs differ, butexpected payoff is identical: (250 +60) =155.
Second example. Let the
investment opportunity's NPV be
+20 in state 1.It was 100 in the firstexample.
State 1 State 2
Asset—in—place a =150 -a=50
Investment Opportunity (NPv) b =20 b =10—0
Thus A + B115 ,andP' =115if the firm issues stock in
both_states.Let'sstart by assuming it does.
In state 1,
v=void+ =270









Note that P'4(144.42 + 85.58) =115,andE =(125.58
+ 74.42) =100.
Now look at the payoffs to oldstockholders:
Issue and Do nothing
Payoff
invest (E =100) (B =0)
void in 144.42 150
state 1
void in 85.58 50
state 2
This is somewhat more complicated.With these payoffs, the optimal_a__
strategyis to issue and invest only in state 2, becausein state 1, the
market value of the old stockholders shares islower when shares are issued.
Butif the firm follows thisstrategy, issuing stock signals state 2 and P'
drops to 60. The equilibrium payoffs are those circledbelow:







Thus the firm passes up a good investmentproject (NPV =+20)in
state 1.Itsmarket values at t =0will be P'=60(state 2)
and P =150(state1).The payoff to old stockholders is
(i50+ 60) =105.Thereis a loss of 10 in firm value —-i.e.,at
t=—1,V =105vs. 115 in the first example.
In this example, the firm is better off withcash in the bank.
IfS =100,thepayoffs, net of the additional cash investment,are
yo f f Invest Dono
old Vin 170 150 state 1
void j 60 50 state2
In thiscase there appears to be an incentivetoleave the cash in
the bank, and issue stock in state 2.Butthat action would immediately—13—
reveal the true state, forcing P' down to60. If the firm does
not have to issue stock to undertakethe project, smart investors
will assume the worst if it does issue.
Discussion
The conventional rationale for holdingfinancial slack—— cash,
liquid assets, or unused borrowing power——is that the firm doesn't
want to have to issue stock on shortnotice in order to pursue a
valuable investment opportunity. Managers pointto the red tape,
delays and underwriting costsencountered in stock issues. They
also typically say,"We don't want to beforced to issue stock when
our firm is undervalued by themarket."
Afinancial economist would respond by asking,tManagers may
have superior information, but why shouldthat be a disadvantage?
If we admit that the firm is sometimesundervalued, then sometimes
it must be overvalued.Whycan't firms take advantage of the market
byissuing securities only when thefirm is overpriced?"
Our examples suggest answers for these questions:slack
has value in example 2, because withoutitthefirm is sometimes
unwilling to issue stock and therefore passes upa good investment
opportunity.
Slack does not allow the firm to take advantageof
investorsby issuing only when stock isovervalud. Firms can get
awaywith that only whentheydo not have slack sufficient to cover their
investment requirements.—11—
The value of slack of
course disappears if the firmcan costlessly
Convey the true values a, b to themarket. One way to justifyour
contrary assumption is to think ofcases in which values dependon
Proprietary information which, ifreleased to the market, would
be released to competitors
also, consequently reducinga and/or b.
The firm cannot
convey that information by saying, "Wehave great
prospects but we can't tell
you the details." In our model, thefirm
always has the incentive to dothis, so such statementscarry no in—
formation. The firm has tosupply verifiabledetailsufficient to
indicate the true state ofnature.Thecostsof supplying, absorbing
and verifying this detailmay be significant.
Slackis clearlyunnecessary if the firm has a "privateline"
toexisting stockholders.However, private communicationto all old
Stockholderswould be difficult and also
illegal for publicly held
firms. Slack is also
unnecessary if the firm can compel itsold
stockholders to buy and holdany new issue; in this case the conflict
between old and new stockholdersdoes not exist.'
Related Work
Our problem is similar to theone addressed by Ackerloff [1], who
showed how markets can break downwhen potential buyers cannot
verify the quality of the product
they are offered. Faced with therisk
of buying a lemon, thebuyer will demand a discount,which in turn
discourages the potential sellers whodo not have lemons. But inour
paper, the seller is not offeringa single good, but a partial claim on
two, the asset—in—place and the newproject. Moreover, the seller
gives up one of them (the newproject) if the partial-claim isnot sold.
Without this more complexstructure we would have little
to say, beyond
notingthat securities can be lemonstoo.—12—
Ackerloff'S paper was one of the first investigationsof the economics
of unevenly distributed information. The assumptionof differential in-
formation underlies extensive recent work on agencycosts, signalling,
adverse selection, etc.A detailed review of all that is notneeded here.
However, several articles are directlyrelevant to our problem:
1. Campbell [4] assumes that firmshave proprietary informationthat
would be costly to convey to the market.
He describes the resulting financing
difficulties and possible remedies. Ills
main point is to provide a new
rationalefor debt financing througn financialintermediaries. It
may for example, be possibleto reveal proprietary informationto a bank
without revealing it to competitors;the bank could then finance a new project
on terms which are fairto old stockholders.
However, Campbell does not considerwhat happens if a firm with proprietary
information does attempt a public issue.He presents no formal equilibrium
model of security pricing and of the
financing and investment decisionsof
the firm.
2. Leland and Pyle [l1J consider an entrepreneurseeking additional
equity financing for a single venture.The entrepreneur knows the project's
expected return but outside investorsdo not. However, the outside in-
vestors observe the fractionof the entrepreneur's personalwealth corn—
initted to the project, and set theirvaluation accordingly. The greaterthe
entrepreneur's willingness to take a personalstake in the project, the more
inventors are willing to pay fortheir share of it.
3.Bhattacharya and Ritter [3] pose a problemsimilar to ours, but
end up asking a different question.e fix the extent of managers'
inside information and examine theequilibrium issue—investment decision.
They ask how much informationthefirmshould reveal, assuming that each-13-
revelationProvides information tocompetitors as well as inventors, and
therefore reduces the value ofthe firm. They show that the firmmay
beable to Convey its true valueto investors without revealingevery-
thing its competitors would like toknow. However, their search forsignalling
equilibria carries them a longwayfromthis paper's analysis.
4.Rendleman {13J also sets aproblem similarto ours. His investors
mayover—or undervalue the firm's assetsor investment opportunities or
misassessits risk. He focuses on thechoice between debt andequity fi-
nancing, but does not derive a full
equilibrium model. For example, he shows
that undervalued firms willtypicallyprefer debt, but does not model
the market's response to thefirm's choice of debtover equity.In general
management's choice of financing
must convey information about the firm's
intrinsic value and actual risk,Of course the sigilal would bemore
complex than in our case, in which thefirm has only two choices: issue
equity or nothing. A full equilibriummodel with more than onefinancing
instrument is beyond us,at least forthe time being. We offersome limited
observations on the debt—equitychoice later in thepaper.
5. There are other theoretical
papers exploring how managers'
inside information is signalledto investors. They includeBhattacharya'g—13a—
work on dividend policy [2],and Ross's papers on"financial incentive
signalling" [14,15], in which amanager's employment contract
leads him
to convey informationabout the firm's prospects
through a choice of
its capital structure.
2. THE FOR1AL 1CDEL
In this section, we give a
formal statement and solution ofthe
model introduced in Section 1. We assume0 <S<Iso that some or
all of the project must befinanced by a stock issue. By varyingslack S,
we vary the size of the requiredissue, EI —S.
If the firm, knowing the truevalues a and b, does not issue,it
forfeits the investment opportunity,so voidS + a. The slack remains
in cash or liquid assets.
If it does issue and invest, E=I—Sand—14—
void(E+S+a+b)
Old stockholders are better off ifthe firm issues only w:en
S + a <P'+E(E+ S + a + b)
or when
P'+E(S+a) <
/Shareof exist ing\ /Share of incremer.t
(assetand slack
(tofirm value ob:ained
going to new / by old stockholders
- \ stockholders /\
The condjtioi can also be written:
(S+a) <E+b . (1)
Thus the line
-(S+a) E+b (Ia)
divides the joint probability distributionof and into two
regions, as shown in Figure 1. If theactual outcome a, b falls in
region N', the firm issues and invests.If the outcome falls in
region N, the firm does nothing.
Remember that the joint probabilitydistribution of a and b is
restricted to the Northeast quadrant ofFigure 1. Region 1' is at











islow. The higherbis, the more the firm loses by not issuing.
The lower a is, the more attractivethe issue price P'.
Of course P itself dependson the probability densities of
inthe regions N and N'. The stock issuewill be fairly
priced to investors if
P' =S+ A(N') +B(t') (2)
where A(M')E(lE=I—S)and B(M') E(E =I—S).These
expectations reflect only the information availableto investors:
the distribution of and and the decision to issue, which
tells investors that the true valuesa and b satisfy Inequality (1).
Figures 2 and 3 display the two numericalexamples presented above
in the format of Figure 1.
Properties of Equilibrium
These equilibrium conditions explainwhy the firm may pass up
good opportunities rather than selling stock to raisefunds. This
occurswith probability F(N). The ex ante loss invalue is
LF(N)(M).L 0 when S >I.Other things equal, L
if E, the required equity issue, increases. Since E =I
theloss also increases with the requiredinvestment I anddecreases
withslack available
Special cases. "Corner solutions,tI in which thefirm always
issues stock or never issues stock, arerarely encountered in this
model given reasonable joint probabilitydistributions for and
This occurs because both and are random and have positive
means, and because the investment decision cannot bepostponed.The
increases
—S,Figure2. Solution forLxamle 1 from Section 2.







































following special cases do give corner
solutions, however. First, if
a is knownby iAwestorsas well .s :anaerS,then stock
is always issued whenb > 0,and thusL =0.Th showthis, irstsubstitute
a for A(M') in Equation(3)
P' =S+ a +
Since BOl') >0,P' >S+ a. The firm will issue stockif
E ()<E+b
This condition must besatisfied if b >0,because (S + a)/P' <1.
The firm will issue whenever b>0,and P' =S+ a + B.
Thus differential information,
restricted to investment o?pOrtUflities
never prevents a stock issue.The terms of sale nay be favorable to
the firm (if b >)or unfavorable (if b <),but even in the latter
case the firm is betteroff issuing than losing the projectentirely.
Second, if the firm has no investmentopportunities ( =0in
all states of the world), thingsbreak down totally: stock is never
issued, except possibly when a
is at a definite lower bound. Let
a .denotea lower bound, and supposethat P' =a.+S. With
mm
mm




C3mpare Inequality (1). Onthe other hand, P'> amleads to
contradiction. If P' =a .+S +e, with e >0,the firmissues
miii—20—
only if a <a + e. Therefore ACM') <a .+e, and P'> S + A(M') mm mm
which violates Eq. (2).
If b is positive and investors know itsvalue,
the firm will issue and invest in at least some states wherea >a.
It may issue in all states——that is, if b is largeenough and the
distribution of tight enough, it may issue even if a is at the
upper bound of the distribution of
One insight of tais model is that you need differential information
about both A and B in order to get Interesting solutions. Without
stock is never issued except when a =a1.Without ,stockis
always issued when b >0.
Issuing stock always reduces stock price. Inthis model, the
decision to issue stock always reduces
stock price, unless the issue
is a foregone conclusion. Thatis, Pt <P.
Let a be the breakeven level ofa, such that the firm is just
indifferent to issuing or not issuing. Ofcourse a* depends on b.
From Eq. (la),
a* + S =P'(l+ b/E)
Natethat A(N)+S >a*+5, because any a <a*would lead the firm
to issue (a <a*implies a* + S <P'(l+ bIE)).Since
P =A(1)S, P >P'(1 + bIE).Sinceb >0,P' (1 +b/E)>P'and
P -P'.—21—
Numerical Solutions
The key to a numerical solutionis of course P' :once we know it,
we can use Eq. (2) to separateregions N' and M.Unfortunately we cannot




aand b.— Nor can we give a morespecific analytical expressionfor P
although calculating Pt by
numerical methods is not difficult.The method
we have used is:
1. Start by setting Pt =S+A+ B. This assumes the firm
always issues stock if b >0.
2. Then determine the regionsM and Mt assuming the firmfaces
this trial value for P' and actsin the old stockholders'
interest.
3. Calculate a new trial valueof P' =S+ A(M') + (M') based
on the regions M andMt from step 2.
4. Continue until pt converges.
This procedure gives the highest
equilibrium P'. We havefound this to be
a unique solution for joint
lognormal distributions of Aand B, and also
for joint normal distributions
truncated to exclude negatives and s.
Table 1 illustrates the resultsobtained in extensive numerical cx—
periments)' It shows L, loss in market value at t=—1,as a percent of
B, the average NPV of theinvestment opportunity. Italso shows F(M'), the
probability the firm will issuestock. 'kandare assumed joint lognor—
al1y distributed. Note that:
a. Increasing slick reducesL/B and increases F(M').
b. Increasing project NPV (B/I)reduces LIB.
-
c.Increasing the required investment
I increases the loss of—22—
TABLE 1
Calculated Losses in Iarket Value
Whenandare Joint Lognormally Distributed
Assumptions: A =100 GA =10or 100
B=l or 10 cyBiO
I =10or 100 S0, 50, 90 or 100 percent of
Xandareindependent





















































Parentheses contain probability that firm willissue.
Source: Majiuf (1978), Table 4,p. 167 and Table 6, p. 169.—23—
valueL/B when B is held constant. For example, compare
L!B for I =10,B/I =.10with LIE for I =100,B/I =.01
(B1 in each case).
d. Reducing the standard deviationof assets in place GA re-
duces the loss in value.(We showed above that L =0when
GA =0.)
We also experimented with the standarddeviation of B and the correla-
tion ofand ,butfound no uniform effects.
Table 2 shows calculated values forLIE and F(M') for less extreme
parameters. A is fixed at100. Suppose the calendar time between t=—l
and 0 or 0 and +1 is 4 years. It is notunusual to find firms growing 10
percent per year, so required
investment is set at I =40,with NPV =+10.
I.')
Thecorrelation between A and B is +0.7——a highcorrelation between the
values of a firm's asset—in—place and growth
opportunities seems realistic.
('-S
Finally,the standard deviations of A and B are setat 50 percent of A and B.
The losses in value shown in Table 2 are clearly economically significant.
3.EXTENSIONS AND IFLIcAIIOS
Having explained our model formally, we can now turn to possible extensions
and qualifications. We also discuss broader issues, for example, the impli-
cations of managers' superior information for capital structure and dividend
policy.
Easy Ways Out
There is of course an easy way out-—an easy way tb avoid any loss of market
value: just issue stock at t =—1,when managers and the
market share the same information. That is one lesson of our model.—24—
TABLE 2
Calculated Losses in Market Value




Loss in Market Value of Percent of B
P(M')
S/I L/B,loss probability








Source: Majluf (1978), Table 18, p. 183.—25—
If managers know more than the market does, firmsshould avoid situations in
which valuable investment projects have to be financed bystock issues.
Having slack solves the problem, and one way to getslack is to issue stock
when there is no differential information.
This is not an easy way out, however, if theinformation differential
is permanent. Suppose managers are always ore periodahead of the market.
At t =— 1,for example, managers would know A and B, but investorswould not.
Investors would see A and B as random variables.
Table 3 shows who knows what, when. Values of assets—in—placeand
the investment opportunity are now subscripted for time.Note that
a1 A0, a2
=A1;b1 =B0,b2 =B1,
etc. The table assumes
that there is only one investment opportunity which mustbe taken at t =0
or lost. Also, investors "catch up" to managersat t =+1.Thus A1 =a1
and =
b1.
Assume the firm has insufficient slack to undertakethe project,
that the amount of slack is fixed unless equity isissued to increase
it, and that the investment required to undertakethe project is known.
Consider the decision to issue E =I—Sdollars of stock at
t =—1.If the firm does not issue, its true market value,known to
managers, is V1 (no issue) =a1
+ b1 + S —L.If it does issue, V1(issue) =
a1
+ b1 + S + E. A stock issue of E =I—Sat t =—1thus has a net value of L,
because it guarantees the firm will invest if b0 > 0.
Now redefine the value of assets—in—place at t—l as
a*1 a1 + b1 —L.Let b*1L. b*1 is the NPV of investing
E= I —Sin cash or marketable securities——i.e., in slack. Managers
know the payoff of investing in slack but investors do not.L is a
random variable from. their point of view, because its value dependson—26—
TABLE 3
Information Available to Managers and the
Market When the Market is Always
One Period Behind
Information
Available to: —2 —l 0 +1
Managers a2 a1 a0 a1
Market A2 a1
Managers b2 b1 b0 b1
Market B2 B1 B0 b1—27—
a1 and b1 ,whichthey will not know until t =0.However, investors do know
the distributions of a1 and b1 and therefore
the distribution of L. That is,
they know the joint distributionof A1 and B1.
This brings us back to the same problem westarted with in section 1.
We have "assets—in—place" worth a*1
=a1
+ b1 —Land "investment
opportunity" worth b1 L. The joint probabilitydistribution of these
values is determined by the firm's actual assets,investment opportunities
and equilibrium issue—investment strategy.At t—1, the firm's decision to
issue and the price investors are willing to payare governed by Eqs (1)
and (2) with the appropriate starred valuesinserted. These equations would
also apply in t =—2,t =—3,etc., when expressed in terms ofappropriatelY
defined variables.
We will not here pursue analysis of the optimalissue strategy in this
dynamic setting. However, we have shownthat the problems addressed in
this paper do not go away when the firm has noimmediate real investment
opportunity. Given differeiLtial information, afirm with valuable future
real investment opportunities is always betteroff with slack than without
it. Moreover, it should build up slack throughretention rather than stock
issues. This is consistent with actualretention policies of most public
firms, which limit dividends so that theywill rarely have to go to the
market for fresh equity.
Thus we add one item in favor of the listof possible arguments for
low dividend payout. On the other hand,dividends would alleviate the
problems posed in this paper if they helpsignal the true value of thus
reducing GA. This is not necessarily an argumentfor high average payout.
It does support positive payout policies with a highcorrelation of changes
in dividends and A.—27a—
This could explain why dividendpayments respond to changes in earnings,
not market value. Earnings reflect theperformance of assets in place.
At this point we revcrt to ouroriginal three—date model, in which
differential information is importantonly at t=0.
Debt Policy
Another easy way out is to issue debtrather than equity. If the
firm can issue default—risk freedebt, our problem disappears: the
firm never passes up a positive—NPVinvestment.
If it can only issue risky debt,our problem is only alleviated: the
firmsometimespasses up positive—NPV investments, but theopportunity loss
is less with debt than with
equity financing. The general rule is: better
to issue safe securities than riskyones.—28—
This requires more careful discussion.Assume the required in-
vestment I, can be financedwith debt, D, or equity E. Theseare
two distittt policiesannounced at t—l and adhered to in t 0.
That is, the firm must choosedebt or equity before managersknow the
true values a and b. (Ifthey could observe a andb and then choose,
we would have a much moredifficult problem, for theirchoice would give
an additional signal toinvestors.)'
The firm issues and investsif vold, the "intrinsicvalue" of the
old stockholders' equity, is higher
with the issue than without it.If
it does issue,
void equals the total firm value less the valueof the
newly—issued securities.
Suppose equity is issued.Then voida + b + I —E1,
where
E1 is the newlyissued shares' market value at t=+1wheninvestors learn a
and b. The issue price of theseshares is just E =I—S at t0. Thus
void =S+ a + b -(E1
—E) S + a + b —AE;AE is the new share—holders'
capital gain or loss whenthe truth comes out at t =+i,conditional on the
firm's issue of shares at t =0.
The firm will issue and invest onlyif
S+a<S+a+b (3)
or if b > tE. Theinvestment's NPV must exceed the capital gain on
newly—issued shares. (Note:AE may be positive or negative. At
equilibrium investors expectit to be zero. The firm knows the true
value.)—29—
Ifdebt is issued, we follow exactly the sameargument, with D and D1 sub-
stituted for E and E1, and reach the same conclusion:the firm will issue
and invest only if b exceeds ADD1 —D.Of course if the debt is default—
risk free, =O,'and the firm always issues and invests when b > O.
Thusthe ability to issue risk—free debt is asgood as financial slack.
If the debt is not default—risk free, ADmay be positive or negative.
It will have the same sign as AE, but its absolute valuewill always be
13/ less.—
Now compare the issue—invest decisions for debtvs. equity financing.
Since b>O, the firm will always invest when AD and AEare negative.
Suppose AD and AE are positive (good news in store foiz investorsat t =+1).
If the firm is willing to issueequity and invest, it is also willing to issue
debt (ADAE, so b > AE => A b > AD). But debt is issued insome states
whereequity is not (AD <b < AE). Thus the ex antevalueof the firmis
higherunder the debt—financing policy, becausethe loss in market value (L) due
to under—investment is less.
This may explain why many firms seem toprefer internal financing to
financing by security issues and, when they doissue, why they seem to prefer bonds
to stock. This could be interpreted as
managerial capitalism——an attempt by
managers to avoid the discipline of capital markets and to cut theties
that bind managers' to stockholders' interests.In our model, this
behavior is in the stockholders' interest.—30—
t in AllStockholder's Interests
Stockholders are better off ex ante,and on average, expost,
if managers maximizeV rather than If they act in the interests
of all stockholders at t
=0,they always issue stockwhen b >0.
Therefore L =0.StockhOlders would vote for thispolicy at t—1 even
though it would sometimes
work against their interest att =0.
The obvious difficulty comeswhen new——or pld__Stockholdersattempt
to verify managers'
adherence to the policy ex post.The temptation to
depart from it is particularly
strong when stock isissued only once and
reputation has no valuefor the future. In practice,there may be
conventions or institutionalarrangements designed to prodmanagers to
take the long view.
Asset SaleandRepurchase of Shares
Supposethefirm already has invested in two assetsworth a1 and a2.
It is t 0,and the market knows the distributionsand A2 but not
a1 and a2.
Also,asset 1 can be sold forC.
First assume that selling the first asset
requires the firm to use the
proceeds C to repurchase shares.This disinvest_rePUrchase decisionwould
be made by exactly the same reasoningas the issue—invest decisiondis-
cussed above. The equilibrium
conditions are exactly the same except
for changes of sign..—30a—
However, firms are rarely, ifever, forced to use the proceeds ofan
asset sale to repurchase shares.
If the proceeds can be heldas cash until
t =1,then the decision to
repurchase signals investors that thefirm's
remaining asset is undervalued at
A2. If the firm insists on repurchasing,
it derives P' to A
,theupper bound of the distribution of A 2max
2
Equilibrium with repurchase couldoccur only when a A and 2 2max
a1 <C.(If there's no upper bound, there's no equilibrium.) In this
case, where the only reason forrepurchasing is to take advantage of
investors who sell,repurchasing would be extremely rare.
The difficulty here is thatrepurchase may reward faithful stock-
holders at the expense of unfaithful
ones. A pro rata repurchase could
avoid the problem, but in thatcase, the firm might just as wellpay a
cash dividend. A pro ratarepurchase is taxed like a cash dividend.
Now turn back to thecase in which the firm hasone asset in place,
and one investment
opportunity, with intrinsic valuesa and b at t =0.
However, the asset—in—placecan be sold.
If it can be sold for
a, without affecting b, then theproblems ad-
dressed in this paper evaporate.i"If the investment
opportunity has
Positive NPV (b >0),the firm sells theasset—in_place. If the proceeds
cover the investment required(a >I),it goes ahead. But alsogoes ahead if
aI, because selling the
asset—in—place reveals its true value.As we
showed above, differentialinformation restricted toinvestment opportunities
never prevents a stock issue.-1-—31—
Thisleads us to another "easy way out." The firm cansimply spin off
its asset—in—place as a separately—financed company.In our model,
stockholders are better off exante holdingholding two firms rather than one,
providing that the spinoff does notreduce the values of the distributions
A and/or B.
Our model's main message is this: givendifferential information, a
firm with insufficient financial slack maynot undertake all valuable in-
vestment opportunities. Thus a firm thathas too little slack increases its
value by acquiring more.
One way to do this is by merger. A merger alwaysincreases value when
one firm's surplus slack fully coversthe other'sdeficiency.'
But the same conditions that create this potentialgain will complicate
the merger negotiations and in some casesrule out any possibility of
their successful completion. Consider a firmwith an existing business,
a good investment opportunity, butinsufficient slack to pay for it.It
seeksa merger with a cash-rich firm. However,the would-be buyer only
knows the distributions andnot the true values a and b.
Let Q'bethe proposed merger price. That is, ifthemerger offer
is accepted, the shareholders ofthe cash—poor firm receive Q' incash.
Iftheoffer is turned down, that firm's shareholders foregothe investment
and are left with S + a.Thus, given a and b, the offer willbeaccepted
ifQ' >S+ a. But the cash—rich firm will only offer Q'
=S+ A (N') +(N'),
where A(N') and B(N') are the expectationsofand 'conditionalon observing
that the cash—poor firm is willing to go throughwith the deal.
Under these assumptions, the mergerwould never occur. The
cash—poor firm can always do better byissuing stock directly to investors,— 2—
because P' always exceeds Q'.1-"
Thedecision to sell shares always carriesnegative information, re-
gardless of whether the shares are soldto investors generally or to a
specific acquiring firm. The buyer orbuyers discount the shares so that
cost equals expected payoff. If the firmissues E =I—S, old shareholders
retain a stake, but if their firm issold they are completely disengaged
from it. The decision to sell all ofthe firm via merger, rather than
issue the fraction E/(P' + E), drivesdown market price below P',becausethe
firm has chosen to sell more stockthan absolutely necessary tocover the
investment I.(tie assume that (1) the acquiring firm'sslack exceeds the
selling firm's deficiency (I —S),(2) the acquiring firm has otherassets,
and (3) everyone knows what theseassets are worth.)
Negotiated mergers thus seem to be ruledout regardless of financing,
because the cash—poor firm canalways do better by issuing stock. Howcan
mergers be explained under the premises of thispaper?
There are two possible explanations.
First, there may be partial or total
disclosure of internal information
during negotiation)2i Second, themerger
maygothrough if the buyer rather than the sellertakes the initiative. In
our model, firms with plenty of slack shouldseek out acquisition targets
which have good investment
opportunities and limited slack, and aboutwhich
investors have limited information
Such firms sell at a discountfrom their
average potential value A++ A tender offer made directlyto the
slack—poor firm's shareholders,at a price above A + + S —Lbut below
A + B + S, makes both thebidder and the target's shareholdersbetter off
exante, althoughneither buyer nor sellers knowthe true value a + b + S.—33—
A tender offer conveys no
bad news about a + b +Sso long as the target's
management are not accomplices.Perhaps this explains why mostmergerSare
initiated by buyers. A firm
that actively seeks to be boughtout may end up
a wallflower. The moreactively management seeks tosell, the less an
outsider will assume their firmis worth.
4. CONCLUSION
We have presented a modelof the issue_investment
decision when the
firm's managers have superior
information. We hesitate to statedefinite
empirical predictions, having
ignored taxes, transaction costs,agency costs,
and other things the decision may
depend on. We can neverthelesssum up by
reviewing the model's mostinteresting properties.
1. It is always better toissue safe securities thanrisky ones.
Firms should go to bond marketsfor external capital, butraise equity by
retention if possible. That is, apolicy of external financingusing
debt is better than one usingequity.
2. The firm should not pay adividend if it has to recoupthe cash by
selling stock or some otherrisky security. Of coursedividends could help
convey manager& superior
information to the market. Ourmodel suggests a
policy under which changesindividends are highly correlatedwith managers'
estimate of the value of assetsin place.
3. Firms whose investment opportunitiesoutstrip operating cash
flows, and which have used uptheir ability to issue low—riskdebt, may
forego good investments ratherthan issue risky securities tofinance them.
This is done in the existingstockholders' interest. However,stockholders—34—
are better off ex ante——i.e., onaverage——when the firm carries sufficient
financial slack to undertake good investmentopportunities as they arise.
The ex ante loss in value increases with thesize of the required
equity issue. Thus, increasing the required investmentor reducing slack
availablefor this investment also increases theex ante loss. Inaddition,
numericalsimulations indicatethe loss decreases when the market's
uncertainty about the value of assets in place isreduced, or when the
investment opportunity's expected NPV isincreased.
4. Firms can build up financial slackby restricting dividends when
invesment requireraents are modest. Thecash saved is held as marketable
securities orreserve borrowingpower.
The other way to build slack is byissuing stock before cash is
required for investment. Firms wouldtry to make such precautionary
issues in periods when managers' informationadvantage is small; they would
definitely issue in periods wheremanagers have no information advantage.
However, wehavenot derived a generally optimal dynamic issuestrategy.
5. When managers have superiorinformation, and stock is issued to
finance investment, stock price will fall.
6. A merger of a slack—rich andslack—poor firmincreasesthe firms'
combined value. However, negotiating suchmergers will be hopeless unless
the slack—poor firms' managers canconvey their special information to the
prospective buyers. If this information cannot beconveyed (and verified),
slack—poor firms will be bought out by tender offersmade directly to their
shareholders.—35—
Of course the six items stated just above depend onthe specific
assumptions of our model and may not followin other contexts. We have
only explored one of many possiblestories about corporate finance. A full
description of corporate financing and investmentbehavior will no doubt
require telling several stories at once.
A more comprehensive theory of financing policywould be a good initial
target for further research. Ourmodel supplies a rationale for debt
financing even in the absence of taxes. Onthe other hand, a policy that
relies too heavily on debt increases thelikelihood of bankruptcy costs and
agency costs or problems ofmoral hazard.' Firms may arrive at their
optimal debt policies by balancing theseconsideratioflS.Z—36—
FOOTNOTES
1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Instituteof Technology, and
National Bureau of Economic Research; UniversidadCatolica de Chile. This
paper draws on Majiuf [12] and an earlier (1978) joint workingpaper with
the same title as this one. The delay in revision isthe senior author's fault.
2. We could interpret our time subscriptnot as calendar time, but just
the state of information available to thefirm and market.
3. That is, managers may have inside information about thefirm, but not
about the market or the economy.
4. An analogy may help make this clear. Think ofa share of IBM stock on
January 1 (t =—1). could be the unknown distribution of the February
1 price, a the actual price on February 1 (t =0).However a fur trap-
per snowed in on the upper MacGregor River might not learn the February
1 price until March 1 (t =+1).
5. Rights issues resolve the conflict of interestonly if old stockholders can be
compelled to exercise their riBhts and hold thenewly—issued shares.
6. However, Grossman's recentpaper [8] on product warranties is worth not-
ing because his underlying problem is like ours. There are alsotempt-
ing analogies between our paper and the literature on creditrationing.
See, for example, Jaffee and Russell [10] and Stiglitz and Weiss[17, 18].
7. Downs and Heinkel [5] contains empirical evidencesupporting the Leland—
Pyle analysis.
8. A formal proof is given in Majluf[12],Appendix 2, pps. 286—290. See
also pps. 142—143.
9. Majiuf [12] shows that at least one equilibrium P' existsif the firm
issues stock. See his Appendix 1,pps. 279—285.
10. Reported in Majiuf [12] pps. 165—183.—37--
11. This problem is addressed inRendleman'S paper 1113]. As noted above,
he does not devise a full equilibriumsolution for it.
12. That is, the change in the debt valueat t1 is independent of
the firm—specific information revealed toinvestors at that time.
Other things, such as a general shiftin interest rates, may change
debt value, but that is irrelevant here.
13. We know this from option—pricing theory.See, for example, Galai and
Masulis [6].
14. Old stockholders are always betteroff ex post if the firm is sure
to have positive NPV opportunity, i.e.,if b is always positive.
In this case, the firm always issues stock, soP' =V1
=A+ B
If managers act in old stockholder's interestat t =0,as we have
assumed, then p' < V1 =A+B —L.
15. What if only part of the asset—in—place canbe sold? If it can be
sold at intrinsic value, the firm treatsthe proceeds as additional
slack and looks again at its issue—investdecision.
16. What if the asset in place can only besold at a discount? What if
the potential buyer does not know its truevalue? What if sale of
the asset in place reduces b? These questionsare worth exploring.
17. If the merged firms' total slack does not fullycover their investment
requirements, the merger may or may notincrease value. See Majiuf
[12], pps. 239—256.—38—
18. A proof follows. Define a*(N')as the breakeven value of a, the
value at which the cash—poor firm is just indifferentto being
acquired at the equilibrium price Q'. Note that Q'a*(N') + S.
Refer again to (la), the requirement for the firmto issue stock:
(S+a) <E+b
If F' were equal to Q', the firm would issue andinvest at a*(N')
for any b > 0. That is, if
P' =Q'=S+ a*(N')
(S + a) = E
, (S+ a*(N')) =E< E + b S+a*(N)
Thus a(M'), the breakeven value of a at which the firmis just
willing to issue stock, exceeds a*(N') forany b > 0.
A(M') + B(M') > A(N') + B(N') and P' > Q'.
19. The cash—poor firm would prefer tonegotiate with a firm that is not
a competitor. A competitor might back out of thenegotiations and take
advantage of information acquired in them. This hazard is less ina
"conglomerate" merger.
20. We assume the target firm has notyet declared its issue—invest
decision.
21. However, there is no mechanism in our modelto insure that such a
policy would be followed at t0 even if announced at -t=1.
22. Agency costs and moral hazard problems exist only whenmanagers
have superior information.—39—
23. Chapter 6 of Najiuf'sthesis [12] has extended ourmodel to cover
several cases of mixed debtand equity financing.—40—
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